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I. INTRODUCTION
DVDs were first introduced to consumers in February 1997 as the
successor to analog VHS tapes.' From the beginning, Hollywood studios
considered the encryption and security of the discs to be of paramount
concern. Originally slated to be released in time for the holiday season in
autumn 1996, the delay grew out of concerns of Hollywood studios about
the threats of copyright infringement and illegal duplication of the movie on
the disc.2 The DVD Copy Control Association (DVDCCA), an industry
consortium, eventually adopted an encryption scheme called the Content
Scrambling System (CSS).3 CSS was designed to "prevent[] movies from
being illegally duplicated, protecting the intellectual property of the
manufacturers, producers and writers from theft."4 It works by using an
algorithm to encrypt sectors on the disc that must then be decrypted using
a special chip when the movie is played on a compatible player, whether it
be a stand-alone player on top of a television or a computer drive.5 Using
I See Donald Liebenson, Companies Testing the DVD Waters, L.A. TIMES, May, 5, 1997, at F6.
2 See, e.g., Peter M. Nichols, Delay of the Disk, N.Y. TIMES,July 26, 1996, Home Video, at 19.
3 Kilroy Hughes, DVD Video Encryption Update: Hollywood, Having Cake and Eating It, EMEDIA
PROFESSIONAL, June 1, 1997, vol. 10.
4 DVD Copy Control Association, http//www.dvdcca.org/faq.html (last visited March 10,
2008).
s Hughes, supra note 3.
FAIR USE
CSS to encrypt a DVD accomplishes two things:6 it prevents the disc from
being played in any device that does not have a CSS decryption chip, and it
prevents disc copying. It is this use of CSS that prevents people from using
popular and commercially available DVD creation software along with the
DVD burner on their computer from copying protected discs.
Part II of this Note explores the historical origins ofnAmerican copyright
law, beginning with royally-granted monopolies in Fourteenth Century
England and ending with the enactment of the first American copyright law
in 1790. From inception, these monopolies were intended for the benefit of
the public good, not for the benefit of the monopoly holder. Part III will
focus on the Copyright Act of 1976 and the fair use doctrine, examining the
legislative and judicial purposes behind the fair use doctrine and the reasons
why it was codified. From there, I will analyze how the Supreme Court
interpreted the fair use doctrine in three different cases and will try to sketch
a brief but coherent image of its meaning, use, application, and
consequences. I will show that the doctrine is a well-established, flexible,
and, most of all, vitally important component in our copyright law. Part IV
will focus on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. I will analyze the
purpose, intent, and meaning behind its three major provisions and how
they relate to the fair use doctrine, both individually and collectively. In Part
V, I will make a new argument for fair use under the Digital Millennium
CopyrightAct. Beginning with the supposition that the purpose of copyright
is to advance the public good, I will rely heavily on the intent of the
legislature and the text of the statute itself to show that the legislature
intended a bridge over the "fair use gap" between the access control
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the anti-
infringement provisions of the rest of the copyright law. In Part VI, I will
analyze the three major cases that have arisen under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act in its relatively young life to date. I will examine the courts'
reasoning and show that my fair use approach is more viable and better able
to protect both the interests of the copyright holders and the general public
good. In Part VII, I conclude with a quick set of contrasting images and a
plea to think about the future of information.
H. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The English Ancestry
Like many aspects of American law, to more fully appreciate the history
and development of copyright law, it is helpful to look to its English origins.
6 See DVD Copy Control Association, supra note 4.
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English copyright law, in turn, derives from English patent law. In 1331,
King Edward III began issuing letters of patent protection for foreign
tradesmen willing to come to England and train the English subjects in their
trades. 7 The first such letter patent, issued to John Kempe of Flanders,
represented "the beginning of a deliberate and vigorous policy to expand
English industry."8 This desire to expand English industry shows that even
in the first government-issued monopoly, the King was ultimately
concerned with the public good: the advancement of the English economy.
By the time of Queen Elizabeth's reign, 9 however, the monarch began
issuing patents not for the introduction of new trades but as forms of
political patronage.'° Despite the rulings of the King's Bench in cases like
Darcy v. Allin" and The Clothworkers of Ipswich,' 2 KingJames 113 continued to
abuse the royal privilege of granting monopolies. 14 This continual abuse of
the monopolistic power led Parliament to pass the Statute of Monopolies15
in 1624 which, with certain exceptions, broadly declared that all monopoly
grants were invalid' 6 and limited all future monopoly patents to a term of
fourteen years. 7 Two exceptions to the Statute of Monopolies were for
Crown-chartered guilds, 8 and for letters patent "of, for or concerning
7 Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History: 1550-1800, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259 (2001).
I8d. at 1259-60 (quoting Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background ofthe English Patent Law, 41 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 615, 625 (1959)).
9 Elizabeth I reigned from November 17, 1558 to March 24, 1603.
I0 Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49
J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.SA, 675, 677-78 (2002).
1 Darcyv. Allin, (1603) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131,1139 (KB.) (ruling in favor ofAllin, upon argument
made by his counsel, that "where any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit or
invention doth bring any new trade into the realm,.. . for the good of the realm; that in such cases the
King may grant to him a monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects may learn the
same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by his invention to the commonwealth; otherwise
not.").
12 The Clothworkers of Ipswich, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (KB.) (holding "if a man hath
brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom ... or if a man hath made a new
discovery of any thing.... [the King] may grant by charter unto him, that he only shall use such a trade
or trafique [sic] for a certain time ... but when that patent is expired, the King cannot make a new grant
thereof; for when the trade is become common, and others have been bound apprentices in the same
trade, there is no reason that such should be forbidden to use it.).
13 James I immediately succeeded Elizabeth 1, and reigned from March 24, 1603 to March 27,
1625.
14 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 679.
15 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3 (Eng.).
16 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 679.
17 21 Jac., c. 3, S 6.
Is Id. S9.
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Printing."' 9 Almost 300 years after the first letter patent was granted,
Parliament recognized that these monopolies were no longer being used to
advance the public good but instead as political favors.
In 1662, Parliament passed the Licensing Act. 20 Consistent with the
express exceptions for Crown-chartered guilds and printing, the Licensing
Act provided that:
[N]o joyner, carpenter, or other person shall make any printing
press, no smith shall forge any ironwork for a printing press, no
founder shall craft any letters which may be used for printing for
any person or persons whatsoever; [nor import or buy materials]
belonging unto printing, unless he or they respectively shall first
acquaint the ...master and wardens of the ...company of
stationers... for whom the same presses, iron work or letters are
to be made, forged, cast, brought or imported."'
That is, the Licensing Act prohibited any person from building or operating
a printing press-and thus printing a book-without approval of the Stationers
Company, which was a Crown-chartered guild. In addition, the Act made
any printing press made or operated with such permission the property of
the Stationers Company. These rights that the Stationers Company came to
enjoy eventually became known as the "Stationers Copyright,"" presumably
because the Company, and not the authors, had the exclusive right to works
it printed. Though the Licensing Act amounted to de facto censorship, 23 it
is important to note that the 17th century English concept of censorship is
not the same as the 21 st century American concept of censorship.24 The goal
of the Act was only to deny public access to "heretical, schismatical, [sic]
blasphemous, seditious and treasonable"25 works. 2 Thus, the Act, while
consistent with the Statute of Monopolies, was not seen as damaging the
19 Id. § 10.
20 1662, 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (Eng.).
21 Id. S 10.
2 Hideaki Shirata, The Origin of Two American Copyright Theories:A Case ofthe Reception of English
Law, 30J. ARTS MGMT. LAW& SOC'Y 193, 193 (2000).
23 L. Ray Patterson, The DMCA:A Modern Version oftheLicensingAct of1662, 10J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 33,33 (2002).
2 See Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and The Rhetoric of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 76 (2003) ("The absolutist regimes of the Tudor and
Stuart monarchs were characterized by pervasive regulation, and they were very different from the post
revolutionary civic society in which copyright law emerged.").
25 1662 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (Eng.).
26 Patterson, supra note 24, at 34.
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public good by keeping books from being published or sold, but rather
protecting the public good by keeping "heretical, schismatical, [sic]
blasphemous, seditious and treasonable" works from undermining the
authority of the monarch after the Restoration.
The Licensing Act expired in 1695, and Parliament chose not to renew
it. This threw the book trade into disarray,27 as the Stationers Company no
longer had a monopoly over the construction, operation, and ownership of
printing presses. Parliament was sympathetic to the Stationers' claims about
disorder in the book trade following the expiration of the Act, but it was not
sympathetic to the Stationers' monopolistic practices, which had turned
literary classics into private estates.28 As a compromise Parliament passed the
Statute of Anne29 in 1710. This statute recognized that it was the authors
themselves, not the Stationers Company (that is, the publisher), that owned
the copyright to the works they produced. The Act provided "[t]hat the
author of any book or books already composed, and not printed and
published, or that shall hereafter be composed ... shall have the sole liberty
of printing and reprinting such book and books for the term of fourteen
years," 0 with a provision that "after the expiration of the said term of
fourteen years, the sole right of printing or disposing of copies shall return
to the authors thereof, if they are then living, for another term of fourteen
years. 31 This fourteen year term was in turn based on the fourteen year term
in the Statute of Monopolies,32 enacted eighty-six years earlier. This Act
struck at the heart of the Stationers Company's business model, as it no
longer allowed them the exclusive rights over the works or the means used
to print the works. The Stationers unsuccessfully lobbied Parliament twice
to reform the Act, once in 1735 and again in 1737, the latter failing in the
House of Lords, "which was particularly hostile to anything that smacked of
monopoly. "33 Two years before the Colonies declared their independence,
the House of Lords, acting in its capacity as the supreme court of Great
Britain, rejected the claim of a common law theory of copyright, holding
that the only basis for copyright was the Statute of Anne.'
27 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 680.
28 Id.
29 Statute of Ann, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). The Act was entitled "An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of
such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned." Id.
30 Id. 1.
31 Id. S 11.
32 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 681.
3 Id. at 681-82.
34 Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L.).
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B. The Constitution and Early Republic
The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t] o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ""
The inclusion ofwhat would become the Copyright Clause seems to be due,
in part, to James Madison and an address he made to the Convention.36
Entitled "Observations, April, 1787, on the Vices of the Political System of
the United States," Madison observed that there was a "want of uniformity
in the laws concerning ... literary property," in part because the Articles of
Confederation provided no national protection to authors or their works.37
The Style Committee considered the matter and reported back to the
Convention on September 12, 1787; without debate, the clause was adopted
by the Convention.3"
The Copyright Clause is unique among Congress' powers. Unlike
Congress' other enumerated powers in the Constitution, which "deno-
minate a sphere ofauthority and leave the details to Congress, the Copyright
Clause includes specific parameters for the content of copyright law."39 The
inclusion of these narrowing parameters-that rights were to be given to
authors, for limited times, to promote the sciences and arts-indicates that
Congress' power to regulate what modem society would term intellectual
property matters is more restricted than Congress' power in other
enumerated areas.' Thus, it follows that not only is the purpose of the
clause to protect intellectual property for the purpose of promoting progress
but that the monopoly for this protection is limited in time and cannot be
extended permanently.4 These stipulations appear to have been aimed at
preventing the kinds of abuses that had prompted the Statute of Monopolies
some 150 years earlier.42
The ratification debates provide some illustration of the fears that some
of the Founding generation held concerning what they viewed as the
35 U.S. CONST. art. 1, S 8, cl. 8.
3 Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitutin, 17 GEO. L.J. 109,
113 (1929).
37 Id.
3 Id. at 114.
39 Marci A. Hamilton, The Historical and Philosophical Underpinnings of the Copyright Clause, in 5
OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8 (Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University, 1999).
40 Thomas A. Mitchell, Copyright, Congress and Constitutionality: How the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Goes Too Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115, 2119 (2004).
41 Id.
42 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 691.
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Government's power to grant monopolies. At the Convention itself, George
Mason (a delegate from Virginia) and Elbridge Gerry (a delegate from
Massachusetts) refused to sign the draft Constitution, partly because in
Mason's words, "[u]nder ... construction of the general clause at the end
of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and
commerce."43 The ratifying conventions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and North Carolina all requested an amendment to the draft Constitution
that prohibited Congress from granting "exclusive advantages of commerce"
to certain companies of merchants; likewise, New York recommended an
amendment that "the congress [sic] do not grant monopolies, or erect any
company with exclusive advantages of commerce."" From the requests of
these state ratifying conventions, it is clear that they had not forgotten the
English monarchy's abuse of monopolies that led Parliament to enact the
Statute of Monopolies, and later, the Statute of Anne.
In New York, a "Son of Liberty"45 wrote that "[m]onopolies in trade
[will be] granted to the favorites of government, by which the spirit of
adventure will be destroyed, and the citizens subjected to the extortion of
those companies who will have an exclusive right."' In Elbridge Gerry's
home state of Massachusetts, "Agrippa"47 wrote "[w] e hardly find a country
in Europe which has not felt the ill effects of such a power [of granting
monopolies] ... in the British islands all these circumstances together have
not prevented them from being injured by the monopolies created there.
Individuals have been enriched, but the country at large has been hurt."
48
Like the state ratifying conventions, these anti-Federalists were wary of the
Government's power to grant monopolies. Proponents of the Constitution
responded to these criticisms, not by denying that monopolies were
generally harmful, but by emphasizing the utilitarian justification for copy-
43 Id. at 693 (quoting 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 45 (Merrill Jenson ed., 1976)).
44 Id. at 694.
45 A name taken, no doubt, to invoke those colonists who first opposed the Stamp Act two
decades earlier, and then general opposition to what they saw as British tyranny.
46 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 693 (quoting 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 482 (Merrill Jenson ed., 1976)).
47 A pseudonym taken possibly to invoke Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, a prominent Roman
general and statesman who was primarily responsible the victory of Octavian's (later Augustus) over
Marcus Antonius and Cleopatra at the Battle of Actium, and for the beautification and rebuilding of
Rome following Augusts being named Emperor.
48 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 693 (quoting 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 498 (Merrill Jenson ed., 1976)).
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rights and patents, and the limitations placed upon them by the Copyright
Clause.49
In The Federalist Papers, Madison wrote of the Copyright Clause that
"[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned .. . [t]he States
cannot separately make effectual provisions ... and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of
Congress."50 In Pennsylvania, the anti-Federalist "Centinel"' wrote that
"monopolies in trade or arts, other than to authors of books or inventors of
useful arts, for a reasonable time, ought not to be suffered."5 2 It is notable
that even in acknowledging that some state-granted monopolies were
acceptable, these monopolies should only have been granted "for a
reasonable time." Perhaps this "reasonable time" was fourteen years as in the
Statute of Monopolies and the Statute of Anne; perhaps it was not. In any
case, the Copyright Clause appeared to the proponents as a means to limit
the duration and purposes for which monopolies could be granted.53 In a
posthumously published essay, James Madison wrote:
Monopolies though in certain cases useful ought to be granted with
caution, and guarded with strictness against abuse. The Constitution
of the U.S. has limited them to two cases, the authors of Books, and
of useful inventions, in both which they are considered as a
compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community as a
purchase of property which the owner otherwise might withhold
from public use. There can be no just objection to a temporary
monopoly in these cases; but it ought to be temporary, because
under that limitation a sufficient recompense and encouragement
may be given.'
While no committee minutes exist that refer to the Copyright Clause,
the words of four influential Founders support the idea that the main
purpose of the clause was to promote science and the arts by limiting the
term of monopoly. In a letter dated July 31, 1788, Thomas Jefferson wrote
49 Id. at 694.
so THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
sI Most probably Samuel Bryan, son of Pennsylvania Supreme Court judge George Bryan, to
whom his essays were at first attributed.
52 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 694 (quoting 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 466 (MerrillJenson ed., 1976)).
53 Id. at 695.
S4 James Madison, Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago, 128 HARPER'S MAG. 489, 490
(1914).
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to James Madison about the impediments that monopolies erect to the
progress of the arts and sciences. He wrote, "[tihe saying there shall be no
monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on by the
hope of a monopoly for a limited time... ; but the benefit even of limited
monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general
suppression.""5 On October 17, Madison replied, "[w]ith regard to
Monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest nusances [sic] in
Government. But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and
ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly renounced?"'
This exchange may seem to be yet another disagreement between anti-
Federalist Jefferson and the Federalist Madison, but a closer examination
reveals that the two were actually in substantial agreement. Both men
opposed monopolies that granted authors unlimited and perpetual rights
over their writings. This much may be inferred from the letters. It was the
extent of the monopoly, however, that characterized their disagreement.
Jefferson believed that "even.. . limited monopolies" did more harm than
good to foster progress. s7 Madison, though, did not take quite such an
absolutist stance. Rather, he believed that as "encouragements to literary
works," they are "too valuable to be wholly renounced.""8 That is, Madison
also saw that an author's monopoly over his works would lead to
impediments to literary and scientific progress. Furthermore, in a January
1790 address to Congress, George Washington indicated that the intent of
the Framers at the Convention (of which he was elected President), in
including the clause, was "to engender a marketplace in writings." 9 This
statement suggests that Washington also favored the clause more as a way of
promoting the arts and sciences than protecting authors.' An allusion made
by ChiefJustice Marshall thirty-four years later in Gibbons v. Ogden6 gives
some indication that this viewpoint had not changed. In the course of the
opinion, Marshall referred to the Copyright Clause as "that part of the
55 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison July 31, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON: 8 October 1788 to 26 March 1789, at 440 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
6 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON: 8 October 1788 to 26 March 1789, at 16,21 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
s7 Letter from Jefferson to Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 442-43 (Princeton 1956).
58 Id. (emphasis added).
59 Hamilton, supra note 40, at 10 (citing GEORGEWASHINGTON,ADDRESS TO CONGRESS (Jan.
8, 1790), reprinted in COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT IN PROGRESS, 1780-1904, at 115-16 (1976)).
60 This is not to suggest in any way though, that Washington did not think that protecting the
writings of authors was unimportant.
61 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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constitution [sic] which empowers Congress to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts." 2
The Copyright Clause's emphasis on promoting literary and scientific
discoveries can also be found in the Republic's first copyright law, 3 entitled
"an Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps,
charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the
times therein mentioned."' The title of this Act parallels the Copyright
Clause itself. In the first clause, we learn that the Act was intended "for the
encouragement of learning;" that is, the purpose of the act was to promote
learning (emphasis added). In a similar vein, we also learn in the first clause
of the Copyright Clause that its purpose is "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."' In the case of both the 1790 Act and the
Copyright Clause, it is only after the grammatical break in the second clause
that we learn how these purposes are to be brought about. Because the first
clause naturally receives more emphasis than the second due to the fact of
it being first, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Framers of the
Constitution and the drafters of the 1790 Act deliberately emphasized the
purposes of"promot[ing] the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful[a]rts" and
the "encouragement of learning" by placing each in the first clause. Again,
the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, reinforces this
emphasis by referring to the Act as "the act for the promotion of useful
arts. ,66
The statute itself was modeled on the Statute of Anne. It took its title
("An Act for the Encouragement of Learning") directly from the English
statute; except for the addition of maps and charts, the language was copied
almost verbatim.67 It provided, inter alia, that the author of any "map, chart,
book or books.., shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing and vending such map, chart, book or books for the term of
fourteen years." 6' It further provided that "any person or persons who shall
print or publish any manuscript, without the consent and approbation of the
author.., shall be liable to suffer and pay to the said author.., all damages
occasioned by such injury."69
62 Id. at 221 (explaining that because the Court's opinion was decided on different grounds, there
was no need to consider the art. I, S 8, cl. 8).
63 See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 2123.
(A 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
66 Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 503 (1818).
67 Ochoa & Rose, supra note 11, at 695.
68 1 Stat. 124(1).
69 1 Stat. 124(6).
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IMI. THE FAIR USE DocTRINE AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
Congress has made two major changes to modem copyright law: the
Copyright Act of 1976 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. This
section will show that, despite these revisions in the statutory law, the
purpose of modem copyright law 70 has not changed and continues to be
consistently interpreted by the courts.
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
Prior to the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976, 7 the copyright law
then in force was "basically the same" as the copyright law that had existed
in 1909 and was unable to adequately handle the technological progress that
had taken place since then.72 The 1976 Act represented the conclusion of a
major congressional reassessment of copyright doctrine.73 One of the
important changes wrought in enacting the 1976 Act was the codification of
the fair use doctrine for the first time.74 Prior to codification, the fair use
doctrine had existed in the United States since at least the early 1840s 75 in
the form of ajudicially-created limitation on the exclusive right of copyright
owners.76 Traditionally, the fair use exception was defined as "a privilege in
others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent. "r7
The fair use doctrine is currently codified at section 107.78 It states in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
70 In this sentence, the word "law" is used in its most general sense, not the specific sense of
certain statutes or lines of cases.
71 17 U.S.C. SS 101-810 (2007).
72 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 5659, 5660.
7 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985).
74 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 71, at 65.
75 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 ("As early as 1841, Justice Story gave judicial recognition to
the [fair use) doctrine in a case that concerned the letters of... George Washington." (citing Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344-45 (Cir. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901))).
76 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 71, at 65. Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569,575-76 (1994) (discussing the history and application of the fair use exception in England and
the United States).
n Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H. Ball, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY
PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
78 17 U.S.C. S 107 (2007).
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copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.7 9
Underneath the apparent plain meaning of the statute lay a bevy of
interpretational problems, textual ambiguities, and conflicting precedents.'
In drafting what was to become 5 107, Congress acknowledged these
underlying problems and attributed them to the fact that although "the
courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over
again, no real definition of the [fair use doctrine] has ever emerged.""' This
was due in part to the doctrine's existence "an equitable rule of reason," and
as such, "each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts."
s2
Nevertheless, this admission that no coherent definition had ever emerged
did not deter Congress from making a legislative finding that the different
criteria which various courts had used throughout the years in adjudicating
fair use claims "essentially... can all be reduced to the four standards which
have been adopted in section 107."83
Perhaps most importantly, Congress showed great foresight and wisdom
in codifying these factors by "endors [ing] the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use" while simultaneously stating its express
"disposition [not to] freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a
period of rapid technological change."' 4 Congress further expounded upon
its purpose and intentions:
79 Id.
90 See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525, 1551-64 (2004). Madison analyzes the statute clause-by-clause, examining the historical and
jurisprudential problems arising from the language. He concludes that "the facial emptiness of the
statutory language means that alone, it is almost entirely useless analytically, except to the extent that it
structures the collection of evidence that a court might think relevant to its decision." Id. at 1564.
81 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 71, at 65.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 66.
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Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section
107 is intended to restate the presentjudicial doctrine of fair use, not
to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."5
The Supreme Court has had ample opportunity to "say what the law is"
regarding § 107 since its enactment more than thirty years ago. The Court
has unambiguously stated that "Congress meant S 107 'to restate the present
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way'
and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use
adjudication."
86
B. Three Fair Use Cases
1. THE BETAMAX CASE: SONY CORP. OF AMERICAV. UNIVERSAL CITY
STUDIOS, INC.
The dispute in Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 7 arose
out of Sony's sale of Betamax videotape recorders to consumers, which
allowed them to record copyrighted programs shown on television.
Universal, along with several other studios, claimed that the act of recording
the programs constituted copyright infringement and that Sony's act of
selling the records to consumers constituted contributory copyright
infringement.' Both parties conducted surveys to determine how
consumers used the recorder. The surveys showed that the consumers'
primary use was time-shifting, 9 the practice of recording a program,
watching it at a later time, and then erasing it from the tape. However, the
surveys also showed that many people had also used the recorders to record
and accumulate a library of taped programs.90 It is not clear how many of
these accumulated programs were copyrighted. Although Universal's suit
85 Id.
86 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, supra note 71, at 66).
87 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
88 Id. at 420.
89 Id. at 423.
90 Id.
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was not against the owners of the Betamax recorders, it had to prove, inter
alia, that they infringed upon Universal's copyrights in order to prevail.9
The Court began by observing that copyright protection "has never
accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his
work.... Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use;'
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use.
"92
Only when a person "trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or
authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth
in the statute, [17 U.S.C. § 106,]" does that person become "an infringer of
the copyright."93
Through Justice Stevens, the Court issued a two part holding. First, it
held that Sony's "sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
used widely for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely
be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."94 The Court reasoned that a
balance must be struck "between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for
effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and
the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce. "95 On the facts, the Court distinguished Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers,96 upon which Universal placed its principal reliance. It explained
that in Kalem, the producer who infringed upon the copyright did not simply
supply the means to make the infringing movie, but he, in fact, had also
supplied the movie itself 97 In contradistinction, Sony merely sold a piece of
equipment capable of recording a wide array of copyrighted and non-
copyrighted programs, while it was actually Universal that supplied the
copyrighted programs to the consumers via the consumers' televisions.
98
Second, relying heavily on the factual findings of the district court, the
Supreme Court held that the Betamax machine is in fact "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses."99 The Court first discussed the recorder's
use as an "authorized" time-shifting device, observing that it could be used
for copying both non-copyrighted programs and copyrighted programs with
the holder's consent,'0° with several examples of such uses in the district
91 Id. at 434.
92 Id. at 432-33.
Id. at 433 (internal quotations omitted).
94 Id. at 442.
9 Id.
% 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
97 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 435-36.
98 Id. at 436-38.
99 Id. at 456.
10 See id. at 443.
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court's opinion. 101 It warned that "an injunction which seeks to deprive the
public of the very tool or article of commerce capable of some noninfringing
use would be an extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented in
copyright law. " 1°2 The Court then turned its attention to "unauthorized"
time shifting, introducing that part of the opinion by stating that "[e]ven
unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing." 13
Accepting the district court's factual findings and applying them to the four
fair use factors enumerated in § 107, the Court found that time-shifting a
movie using the Betamax recorder was a noncommercial, nonprofit
activity,' ° and that Universal failed to show that its use as documented in
the record was likely to have a demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or value of, any one of the copyrighted works.' 5 According to
the Court, "an interpretation of the concept of fair use ... requires the
copyright holder to demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may
condemn a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law." "°6
Interpreted technically and narrowly, the Court simply held that Sony
was not liable for contributory infringement of Universal's copyrights by
merely selling the Betamax recorder.'07 But to read this case in such a way
is both intellectually dishonest and illogical. In outlining its analysis, the
Court expressly and unambiguously declared that for Universal to prevail,
it would "have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax had
infringed . . . [its] copyrights. "108 This requirement is entirely consistent
with reason and logic. Sony was being sued for contributory copyright
infringement, but there can be no contribution on Sony's part unless there
first exists an act of copyright infringement. In other words, the necessary
condition for a contributory infringement claim against Sony is that
infringement occur in the first place. In this way, fair use becomes the heart
of the Court's decision. By weighing the four factors in § 107 (albeit giving
more weight to one and four, than to two and three), the Court was able to
decide the case "on its own facts" and to "come to an equitable rule of
101 See id. at 444-46.
103 Id. at 444.
103 Id. at 447.
104 Id. at 449.
105 See id. at 450-53.
106 Id. at 454.
107 See id. at 456. At the outset, the Court said that "[t]he question presented is whether the sale
of petitioners' copying equipment to the general public violates any of the rights conferred upon
respondents by the Copyright Act." Id. at 420. It concluded that "Sony's sale of such equipment to the
general public does not constitute contributory infringement ofrespondent's copyrights." Id. at 456.
1o Id. at 434.
reason"1°9 that the consumers' use of Betamax machines to record
copyrighted programs fell within the scope of fair use.
2. HARPER & Row PUBLISHERS V. NATION ENTERPRISES
Only a year after Sony, the Court had another chance to consider the fair
use doctrine in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises. "0 As a result
of contractual negotiations with former President Ford, Harper & Row held
the exclusive rights to publish his memoirs in book form and to license
prepublication excerpts of the book to organizations such as newspapers and
magazines."' Time magazine bought the right to publish a 7,500 word
excerpt one week before the book went on sale, paying $12,500 in advance
and $12,500 at publication." 2 Two or three weeks before Time was
scheduled to publish the excerpt, an unidentified person brought a copy of
the Ford manuscript to an editor at The Nation, a political commentary
magazine.113 In an attempt to "scoop" Time, the editor culled together "a real
hot news story" consisting of quotes, facts, and paraphrases drawn
exclusively from the manuscript, making no independent commentary,
research, or criticism." 4 The Nation published the article. Time cancelled its
planned excerpt and refused to pay the remaining $12,500 owed to Harper
& Row, who then filed suit against The Nation for, inter alia, violations of the
Copyright Act." 5
ThroughJustice O'Connor, the Court held that The Nation's preemptive
publication of the manuscript "was not a fair use within the meaning of the
Copyright Act."" 6 Discussing the history and application of the doctrine, the
Court concluded that an important, but not determinative, factor tending to
negate a defense of fair use was the unpublished nature of a work." 7 The
Court then proceeded to swiftly reject the magazine's argument that it was
protected by the First Amendment in disseminating news for the public
good,"' by effectively characterizing the First Amendment and the
Copyright Clause as having a symbiotic relationship and arguing that if the
109 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 71, at 65.
1o 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
III See id. at 542.




116 Id. at 549.
I11 See id. at 554.
118 See id. at 555-56.
20081 FAIR USE
188 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:171
magazine's argument was accepted, the First Amendment would eviscerate
the protections offered to the copyright holder." 9
After rejecting The Nation's constitutional claim, the Court began its fair
use analysis by weighing each of the statute's four factors within the context
of the factual record and the applicable case law. In evaluating purpose, the
Court agreed with the circuit court that The Nation's general purpose in
publishing the excerpts was for "news reporting" and concluded that the
magazine went beyond simply reporting uncopyrighted information, seeking
instead to make a "news event" out of an unauthorized use of the
copyrighted memoir. 20 The Court characterized these acts as "commercial"
as opposed to "nonprofit," and explained that "[t]he crux of the
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price." 2' Additionally,
in evaluating purpose, the magazine's stated intent to "scoop" Time cannot
be ignored.-
In evaluating the nature of the work, the Court returned to the fact that
neither the Time excerpt nor the book itself had actually been published.
That a book is unpublished "is a critical element of its nature" because the
Court's "prior discussion establishes that the scope of fair use is narrower
with respect to unpublished works."12 Fair use is narrower in cases like this,
because of the weight given to the author's right to control the first public
appearance of his expression.
124
Evaluating the amount or substantiality of the portion of the book used,
the Court succinctly quoted the district court: "The Nation took what was
essentially the heart of the book."" s
Finally, the Court examined the effect on the market of The Nation's
published excerpts. It began by declaring this factor to be "undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use" and, when "properly applied, [it]
is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the
marketability of the work which is copied.' 26 With Time's refusal to pay the
remaining $12,500 and its cancellation of the planned publication of the
19 See id. at 555-60.
120 Id. at 561.
121 Id. at 562.
'2 See id.
12 Id. at 564.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 564-65.
126 Id. at 566-67.
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excerpts, the Court plainly stated that "[r]arely will a case of copyright
infringement present such clear cut evidence of actual damage.
" '27
While not a landmark decision in the same way as the Betamax case,
Harper & Row was nonetheless an important affirmation and explanation of
the Court's fair use jurisprudence.
3. CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC, INC.
In deciding Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 128the Court relied heavily
on its earlier decisions in Sony and Harper & Row. Campbell, a member of
the rap group 2 Live Crew, wrote a song called "Pretty Woman." It was a
parody of the earlier Roy Orbison song "Oh, Pretty Woman," and the group
released it on one of their albums."2 Acuff-Rose, the copyright holder of the
Roy Orbison song, sued 2 Live Crew for copyright infringement. 30
Once again, the Court began by discussing the history and application
of the fair use doctrine.'3' Most importantly for the context of this case, it
emphasized that § 107's four factors may not be "treated in isolation, one
from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in
light of the purposes of copyright." 132 The Court proceeded to do exactly
that.
In discussing the first factor, the profitable or nonprofitable purpose or
character, the Court concluded that it was wrong for the court of appeals to
give his issue "virtually dispositive weight. " 133 Citing Sony, the Court
reiterated that fair use under § 107 requires a balancing of interests, not hard
evidentiary presumptions. 34 Quoting Harper & Row, the Court recognized
a tension because Sony also stood for the proposition that the "fact that a
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a ... factor that tends
to weigh against a finding of fair use." 135 However, the Court was very
careful to delineate this proposition, saying that "the fact that even the force
of that tendency will vary with the context is a further reason against
elevating commerciality to hard presumptive significance.
" 136
17 Id. at 567.
128 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
129 See id. at 572.
130 See id. at 572-73.
131 See id. at 574-78.
132 Id. at 578.
1 Id. at 584.
134 Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)).
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The Court gave very little consideration to the second factor, the nature
of the copyrighted work. It explained that this factor does not help in a
parody case "since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known,
expressive works." 137 Because parodies by their nature bear a resemblance to
copyrighted works, this resemblance cannot be used to prove that the creator
of the parody purposefully meant to infringe upon the copyright.
The Court then moved to the third factor, the amount and substantiality
of the portion to the whole. As with the second factor, the Court observed
that parody presented a difficulty; parody must be able to:
[C]onjure up at least enough of that original [work] to make the
object of its critical wit recognizable. What makes for this
recognition is quotation of the original's most distinctive or
memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the audience
will know. Once enough has been taken to assure identification,
how much more is reasonable will depend.., on the extent to
which the song's overriding purpose and character is to parody the
original, or in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve as
a market substitute for the original. But using some characteristic
features cannot be avoided. 3'
The Court concluded that the court of appeals erred in ruling that 2 Live
Crew's parody copied too much from Orbison's song. 39 Invoking Harper &
Row, the Court stated that "[c] opying does not become excessive in relation
to parodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the original's
heart." 4O
The Court then came to the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the
market or value of the copyrighted work. After a somewhat convoluted
discourse on presumptions, burdens, and economic harm,'4 ' the Court states
simply that neither party introduced evidence on the effect of 2 Live Crew's
parody upon the market for Orbison's original song.
42
Through Justice Souter, the Court issued a two part holding. First, in
the context of transformative use, "[iut was error for the Court of Appeals
to conclude that the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody of 'Oh,
13 Id. at 586.
138 Id. at 588.
139 See id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 590-93.
142 See id. at 593.
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Pretty Woman' rendered it presumptively unfair."'43 Second, "[t] he court [of
appeals] also erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had necessarily copied
excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic purpose of
the use."' As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. 4s
C. The Fair Use Doctrine on the Eve of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act
Sony, Harper & Row, and Campbell are the three major cases in which the
Supreme Court considered the fair use doctrine during the three decades
between the enactments of the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. The Court has adjudicated these cases with the
fundamental supposition that the purpose of copyright law is to promote the
public good. But what is the public good? And how does the Court know
how to determine and protect it?
In the beginning of each of the three opinions, the Court stressed that
the nature of the fair use doctrine required each case to be decided upon its
own issues. This method of adjudication is a good thing. It is how the courts
have been adjudicating fair use since the doctrine's inception over 150 years
ago. 146 Moreover, this is how Congress envisioned the courts continuing to
adjudicate the doctrine into the future while in the process of legislating the
1976 Act.147 Something must be said for the continued stability and
predictability of a branch of the federal government, not to mention the
(unusual) deference of one branch toward the others in certain matters.
It is precisely this case-by-case approach, combined with the equitable
nature of the fair use doctrine, 48 that allows the courts to promote the public
welfare. Indeed, Campbell recognized that "the fair use doctrine . . . 'permits
and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when,
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
143 Id. at 594.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Riding circuit, Justice
Story said thatjudges must "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits,
or supersede the objects, of the original work. Many mixed ingredients enter into the discussion ofsuch
questions." Id. at 348.
147 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 71, at 66 ("The bill endorses the purpose and general
scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute
... the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.").
14s See id. at 65.
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foster.'"'49 The Sony Court employed this principle when it recognized that
it would be an "unprecedented" and "harsh remedy" to "deprive the public"
of the Betamax players (and by implication, any other device which could
record copyrighted television programs) by issuing an injunction simply
because the machines were capable of uses that infringe copyrights.'50 The
Court was clear in its choice of words. By using the word "deprive," it
recognized that a rigid enforcement of the copyright law in this instance
would cause an entire sector of the home entertainment market-personal
video recorders-to become illegal almost overnight. Attendant effects
would almost certainly include some job loss for those who manufactured
and sold personal video recorders, as well as decreased income and revenue
for merchants who could no longer sell them and perhaps even carriers who
could no longer transport them. In the context of this case, the Court seems
not only to be protecting the fair use rights of individuals, in terms of time-
shifting and recording for personal non-commercial purposes, but also
securing the welfare of the public, in terms of the secondary economic
effects of suddenly removing the Betamax recorder from the market.
Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that the first Betamax player
was introduced in 19751s and that the original suit in the district court was
filed in 1976.1"2 Thus, the technology at issue was still in its infancy during
litigation, its full reach and potential not yet known. It is not a stretch to say
that if the Court had decided against Sony, some of the technology taken for
granted today either would not exist or would exist in very limited or
functionally-reduced forms. Devices such as TiVo, because of its ability to
record and time-shift copyrighted television programs; CD/DVD burners
and their associated disc authoring software, because they collectively can be
used to copy commercial music and movie releases; and even iPods, because
they can be used for time-shifting individual tracks (i.e., making a playlist),
all suddenly seem questionable under copyright law if Sony had gone the
other way. Of course, we know this with the benefit of hindsight. Even so,
on a macro level, it would not be an unfair modem reading of Sony to say
that technological innovation and implementation, along with its attendant
effects, are an aspect of the public good which can be engendered through
the fair use doctrine. To be clear, this is not to say that we should read into
the case things that are not there (i.e., TiVos, CD/DVD burners, and iPods),
because to do so is sophistry. Nor should judges attempt to predict the
149 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
150 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 444 (1984).
151 See Benny Evangelista, Proposed Copyright Law Raises Controversy, S.F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 8,
2002, at El.
152 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 420.
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future; obviously they should not. Rather, it simply means what it says.
Technology evolves at a rapid pace in modem society, and technological
innovation is part of the public good. When appropriate, this public good is
advanced and protected in part through a judicious and scrutinous
application of the fair use doctrine. In other words, as the Court recognized
in Aiken, "[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic
purpose." 53
As Sony and the subsequent history of home electronics demonstrate,
the fair use doctrine can have profound consequences on society, whether
or not they are seen. Of course, it goes without saying that although the
application of the fair use doctrine may have profound consequences, it does
not mean that fair use adjudication should not depart from its traditional
method as practiced by the courts. The Court recognized this in Harper &
Row,'- not in the context of rapidly evolving technology, but in the
dissemination of news and other public information. Though contextually
different, the concept is still valid: fair use adjudication may have widespread
results. "Regulating" the way by which news and information may be
disseminated is arguably just as important, if not more so, than "regulating"
new technology.
In Harper & Row, the Court categorically concluded that the fair use
doctrine is not a valid defense to infringement of the copyright holder's right
of first publication, even for items of news, by rejecting The Nation's
argument that the public's interest in learning the news contained within the
(copyrighted) book outweighs the right of the author to control its first
publication,' 5  and concluding that it "would expand fair use to effectively
destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the work of a public
figure."15 6 It is no small matter to effectively declare a certain method of
reporting the news illegal. The Court obviously does not say this in such
plain terms but that is the practical effect of its decision. Under the guise of
fair use, publishers can no longer take copyrighted news information and
then "scoop" the copyright holder by publishing it before he does, simply
because an item is deemed to be news. Perhaps, as the dissent warned, this
rejection of The Nation's argument has indeed subsequently "risk[ed] the
robust public debate of public issues that is the essence of self government"
and resulted in the ability of publishers to "monopolize information."
5 7
IS3 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
154 Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
15s See id. at 556-57.
156 Id. at 557.
157 Id. at 604 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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Regardless of whether the majority saw this or simply disagreed with the
dissent, the possibility of such drastic consequences did not cause the Court
to deviate from its standard fair use jurisprudence. 58
Harper & Row also expanded upon the commercial-noncommercial
distinction made by the Sony court. Sony's analysis tended to conflate the
purpose and nature of the work with its potential effect on the market. It
concluded that:
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires
proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. 5 9
Yet, while Sony explained the requirements of a challenge to a noncom-
mercial use, it did not expressly define the difference between commercial
and noncommercial uses. It simply accepted that the consumer's use of the
Betamax recorder was noncommercial. ' However, Harper & Row
segregated its analysis of the purpose and character of the use from its effect
upon the market. The Harper & Row court responded to The Nation's
argument that news reporting is not purely commercial by explaining that
"[t] he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price. 16' This critical factual distinction is what separates Sony from Harper
& Row. The consumers in Sony were not looking to profit from the use of
the recorded television programs,162 while The Nation "actively sought to
exploit the headline value of its infringement, making a 'news event' out of
158 See id. at 552 (majority opinion) ("[Flair use analysis must always be tailored to the individual
case.').
159 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
160 See id. at 449 ("If the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making
purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here,
however, because the District Court's findings plainly establish that time-shifing for private home use
must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity."). The Court did say, however, that "[i]f
the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a
noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated." Id. at 451.
161 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
162 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449 ("[T]he District Court's findings plainly establish that time-
shifting for private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.").
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its unauthorized first publication.""6 Campbell set itself apart from both Sony
and Harper & Row. There was no dispute that the purpose of the use was
commercial,' 64 but the Court nevertheless concluded that a commercial use
in and of itself did not amount to copyright infringement. 65 It explained that
while Sony said "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively.., unfair," the circuit court erred in giving the commercial
nature virtually dispositive weight,"6 because Sony also "emphasized the
need for a 'sensitive balancing of interests'" and called for no hard
evidentiary presumptions.
167
Campbell follows Harper & Row in segregating its analysis of the use's
nature and purpose from its effect on the market. But despite its reliance
upon Sony in recognizing that fair use can encompass at least some
commercial uses, its analysis of the effect of a use upon the market is
inconsistent with Sony's analysis. Campbell held that courts are required "to
consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions
of the alleged infringer but also 'whether unrestricted and widespread
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would result in a
substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original."'" In
contrast, Sony required "evidence of some meaningful likelihood of future
harm" that "if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work."6 9 The difference between "a
substantially adverse impact" and "adversely affect" may be impossible to
quantify, but it is important nonetheless. Campbell's formulation imposes a
higher burden of proof on the party alleging infringement. Because of this
"substantially" higher burden, Campbell effectively enlarges the scope of fair
use by giving to those claiming it more room to act before they
"substantially" affect the market. Campbell also introduces a greater degree
of subjectivity into the court's determination of whether the burden of proof
has been met. While this subjectivity may lead to inconsistent decisions
under some circumstances, it also forces courts to consider the individual
case and its factual context more closely. This kind of consideration is a
central tenant of fair use jurisprudence.
163 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
164 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 573-74 (1994) (describing how
Campbell wrote and recorded a parody of"Oh Pretty Woman" and subsequently released it as a song
on an album).
165 See id. at 583-84.
166 Id. at 584 (quoting Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
167 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455).
168 Id. at 590 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT S 13.05[A1 [4]
(1993)).
169 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451.
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Despite disagreement on the extent to which the market must be
harmed, the Court remained consistent in suggesting that the market for a
copyrighted work should be construed narrowly to mean the market for that
work and only that work. Sony implicitly defined "market" within its factual
context by relying on the district court's analysis of the alleged harm that
Betamax would have caused: "[i]t rejected respondents' 'fear that time-
shifting will reduce audiences for telecast reruns' ... And it declared that
respondents' suggestion 'that theater or film rental exhibition of a program
will suffer because of time-shift recording of that program' 'lacks merit.'"'70
The Court indicates that the market for a television program is the
propensity for an audience to watch that program again at some point in the
future. Whether "reruns" refers to the re-airing of an episode itself or to the
re-airing of the series of episodes that constitute the program is ambiguous
but ultimately does not matter. It would be unreasonable and inconsistent
with the concept of television reruns 7' to interpret it as meaning two
different programs. Similarly, the Court indicates that a market for a movie
is the propensity of an audience to either see that movie in a theater or rent
it at some later point in time.
In a similarly narrow interpretation, the market in Harper &Row was the
appearance ofprepublication excerpts of President Ford's memoirs in Time,
not the publication of the book itself one week later. The Court observed
that:
Time's cancellation of its projected serialization and its refusal to pay
the $12,500 were the direct effect of the infringement.... Rarely
will a case of copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence
of actual damage. Petitioners assured Time that there would be no
other authorized publication of any portion of the unpublished
manuscript prior to April 23, 1979. Any publication of material...
would permit Time to renegotiate its final payment. 72
As with Sony, it is possible to define the market based on the harm done to
it.' 73 Here, the Court is clearly concerned with the harm done to Time's right
170 Id. at 453 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 2d 429, 467-68
(C.D. Cal. 1979)).
171 "Rerun" is defined as "[a] repeat showing of a motion picture." OxIORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
17 Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985) (italics added).
173 To be sure, unlike in Sony, the Court found that there was actual harm in Harper & Row.
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to publish excerpts prior to the book's public release, coming as a direct
result of The Nation's intent to "scoop" Time.
74
Campbell presents what is perhaps the most narrow (and amusing)
definition of a market. As with Sony, the extent of the market may be
inferred from the alleged harm done to it. Because the purpose of the use
was parody, Campbell analyzed the parody (2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman")
and the original (Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman") partly against the
background of derivative works. 175 The Court remanded the case, in part
because of an "evidentiary hole," and noted that "[a]lthough 2 Live Crew
submitted uncontroverted affidavits on the question of market harm to the
original, neither they, nor Acuff-Rose, introduced evidence or affidavits
addressing the likely effect of 2 Live Crew's parodic rap song on the market
for a nonparody rap version of"Oh, Pretty Woman."'76 Although the parties
were required to submit evidence on the possible impact of the parody on
a hypothetical nonparody rap version of"Oh, Pretty Woman" because of the
derivative works doctrine," the Court's explanation is still valuable for
expressly noting 2 Live Crew's "submitted" and "uncontroverted affidavits"
on the market harm to "the original." By doing so, the Court confirmed that
the market consists of only one song (and not, for example, the album
containing the song) and impliedly reaffirmed the narrow construction given
to determining the market for a copyrighted work.
The effect of a use upon the market for a work is in turn closely bound
with the amount and substantiality of a copyrighted work used. While
"amount" and "substantiality" might seem to be synonymous, they can
convey substantially different meanings in fair use jurisprudence. In Sony,
the consumers were using the Betamax recorders to record entire copy-
righted shows so that they could either time-shift or archive them.' 78 The
Court considered the circumstances and reasoned that:
[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted
audiovisual work, and that [time-shifting] merely enables a viewer
to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in its
174 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542 ("The piece was timed to 'scoop' an article scheduled shortly
to appear in Time magazine.").
175 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,591-92 (1994) ("Indeed, as to parody
pure and simple, it is more likely that the new work will not affect the market for the original in a way
cognizable under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it.").
176 See id. at 593-94.
1 See id. at 590 (The inquiry "must take account not only of harm to the original but also of
harm to the market for derivative works.") (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569).
178 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984).
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entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced
does not have its ordinary effect of mitigating against a finding of fair
use.
" 179
The Court seems to say that, ordinarily, copying an entire work will tend to
work against a finding of fair use. But because these consumers were acting
in a nonprofit, noncommercial manner,"s and because the consumers were
able to view the television programs "free of charge," now the fact that they
copied an entire program will not work against a finding of fair use. In other
words, in this factual context, the amount or substantiality factor is neutral.
These words do not convey different meanings. They convey no meanings.
This statement also has important implications, but they are wrapped up
in its ambiguities. First, and foremost, the Court never elaborates on the
"nature" of a "televised copyrighted audiovisual work" beyond the fact that
a consumer is "invited" to watch such a work "in its entirety free of
charge." 81 But this description raises even more questions. The Court
cannot possibly mean "free of charge" in its literal sense, as it is obvious that
watching a televised program costs money, from the electricity that powers
the television, to the cable subscription or antenna actually used to get
content on the screen. Perhaps then, "free of charge" is used in the sense
that, after all of these costs, the copyright holder does not charge the
consumer an additional fee to view the copyrighted program. Contextually,
this interpretation is reasonable. It is not very likely that Justice Stevens
would have included random, errant words in the Court's opinion, nor is it
likely that the members of the majority would be so out of touch with reality
to know that getting a picture onto one's television screen is not, in fact, free.
Perhaps, also, "free of charge" is used in the sense that paying for a cable
subscription or an antenna gives one the legal right to have access to a
copyrighted program shown on television, whereas a person who pirates
cable or steals the signal from his neighbor's antenna does not have the legal
right to have access to copyrighted programs shown on television. This is
also a reasonable interpretation, especially given that stealing cable or other
similar unauthorized reception is usually a punishable offense.
The ambiguities of this pronouncement are considerably eliminated
when considered in the context of the case, its facts, and the other factors
present in § 107. This is partly why the Sony court recognized that each case
'7 Id. at 449-50 (internal citations omitted).
18 This is established in the sentence immediately preceding the quoted one. See id. at 449. It
is also the basis of the purpose inquiry, discussed supra.
101 Grammatically, even this interpretation is strained.
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"must" be decided on its own facts.82 Otherwise, such pronouncements
would risk becoming overbroad generalizations that defeat the very purposes
for which copyright law was originally enacted. One year later, the Court
also recognized this principle of adjudication in Harper & Row."s It is the
recognition of this principle that explains the seemingly anomalous
outcomes between Sony, Harper & Row, and Campbell.
In Sony, there is no tension between amount and substantiality because
amount subsumes substantiality. In recording the entire unadulterated
program, the consumers must have, by definition, copied the substantial
parts of that program as well. The tension between these two concepts only
becomes apparent in Harper & Row and Campbell. In Harper & Row, out of a
200,000 word manuscript,'84 The Nation copied 300 words verbatim that
were supposed to appear in Time's exclusive 2,250 word article.'8 These 300
words constituted approximately thirteen percent of the article. The Court
recognized that "[i]n absolute terms, the words actually quoted were an
insubstantial portion of [President Ford's memoir,] 'A Time to Heal,'"'8 but
nevertheless concluded that copying those 300 words was not protected
under the fair use doctrine.' s The Court explained:
[The Nation] took what was essentially the heart of the book.... A
[Time] editor described the chapters on the pardon as "the most
interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript." The portions
actually quoted were selected [by The Nation's editor]... as among
the most powerful passages in those chapters . . . because they
qualitatively embodied Ford's distinctive expression.
1 8
This description illustrates the difference between "amount" and "substan-
tiality." Even though the Court describes the 300 words as an "insubstantial
portion," it would be more accurate to say that only a small amount of the
original copyrighted work was copied, but because this small amount
contained what was "essentially the heart" of the work, it constituted a
182 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450 n.31 ("[S]ince the [fair use] doctrine is an equitable rule of reason,
no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its
own facts ... combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation
of exact rules in the statute.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 71, at 65-66).
183 Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 552-53 (1985) ("[F]air use
analysis must always be tailored to the individual case. The nature of the interest at stake is highly
relevant to whether a given use is fair." (internal citations omitted)).
184 Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185 See id. at 543, 569.
186 Id. at 564.
187 See id. at 565-66.
iss Id. at 564-65 (internal citations omitted).
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substantial portion. Thus understood, "amount" refers to the quantity or
percentage value of the copied work to the copyrighted work, while
"substantiality" refers to the quality or importance of the copied amount to
the copyrighted work.
In these terms, that The Nation copied a small amount, but a substantial
portion, of President Ford's memoir contributed to the Court's refusal to
find that it was protected under the fair use doctrine. The reverse situation
can also be true. In Campbell, Campbell copied a large portion of Roy
Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman," but the Court recognized that
"[c] opying does not become excessive in relation to parodic purpose merely
because the portion taken was the original's heart." 9 The Court quickly
clarified however, that not everyone "who calls himself a parodist can skim
the cream and get away scot free.""9 Nevertheless, the Court explicitly
recognized that in some contexts, such as parody, fair use contemplates a
person copying a substantial amount 9' of the copyrighted original.
In sum, prior to the adoption of the DMCA, the fair use doctrine was
regarded as flexible and adaptable to different sets of facts and circumstances.
It required a close, individual, and case-by-case examination of the facts,
which would then be analyzed in the context of the four nonexclusive
factors set forth in § 107, with no one factor given dispositive weight. The
case would be adjudicated with the purpose of advancing the public good,
and to that end the interest of the copyright holder was carefully balanced
against the public's interest in the use of the copyrighted material.
IV. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE AND THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
A. The Purpose and Origins of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
President Clinton signed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) into law on October 28, 1998.'92 The DMCA was the first major
revision of copyright law since the 1976 Act and was intended by Congress
to update the law so as to protect a copyright holder's interest in his property
in the face of technological change, especially with the digital online
world.' 93 In this sense, the 1976 Act and the DMCA are siblings.
189 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).
190 Id. at 589.
191 In this case, 2 Live Crew copied the song's first line and base riff They also added other
sounds however, and altered the drum beat. See id.
192 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
19 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998).
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More specifically, Congress drafted the DMCA so as to implement two
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties to which the
United States was a signatory nation, the "Copyright Treaty" and the
"Performances and Phonograms Treaty." 194 This Note is only concerned
with the Copyright Treaty, 9s which "[r]ecogniz[ed] the profound impact
of the development and convergence of information and communication
technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic works."'96 In so
doing, the treaty required, inter alia, that: "Contracting Parties shall provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors
in connection with the exercise of their rights" and "restrict acts, in respect
of [the author's] works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned
or permitted by law."' 9
The focus of this Note is § 1201 of the DMCA as codified, entitled
"Circumvention of copyright protection systems."' 98 Section 1201 in turn is
divided into eleven subsections. The primary emphasis will be on § 1201(a),
(b), and (c).
Perhaps the most important fact to remember throughout the rest of this
Note is that the provisions of§ 1201 are not copyright laws per se. They do
not grant additional protection to a copyrighted work, nor do they give the
copyright owner additional rights or interests in his work. Instead, the
provisions make it illegal to circumvent the protection measures employed by
copyright owners to protect their copyrighted works.'9At least superficially,
a violation of one or more of § 1201's anticircumvention provisions is a
separate offense than the offense of actually infringing upon a copyrighted
work, for which an individual may be held both civilly and criminally
liable.20
194 Id. pt. 2, at 20 (1998).
19s World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65.
196 Id. at Preamble.
197 Id. at art. 11.
198 17 U.S.C. S 1201 (2007).
199 See David Nimmer,A RiffonFair Usein the Digital Millennium Copynight Aa, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
673, 686 (2000) ('Note that the gravamen here is not copyright infringement."); see also Eugene R.
Quinn, Jr., An Unconstitutional Disguise: Did Congress Overstep its Constitutional Authority in Adopting the
Circumvention Prevention Provisions ofthe Digital Millennium CopyrightAct?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 33,54 (2002);.
2 See 17 U.S.C. SS 1203-1204 (2007).
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B. Fair Use and Section 1201
1. THE BAsIc PROVISION: SECTION 1201(A) (1)
Section 1201(a) (1) (A) has been described as the "basic provision" at the
"core" of the DMCA.201 It provides that "[n]o person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title [sic]." 2tQ
Subsection (a) generally prevents the unauthorized access to a copy-
righted work by prohibiting the circumvention of effective technological
copyright protection measures. 2°3 That is, it targets the use of a circumven-
tion technology. 2°4 The House explains that it "applies when a person has
not obtained authorized access to a copy .. .of a work for which the
copyright owner has put in place a technological measure that effectively
controls access to his or her work."25 It does not apply "to the subsequent
actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to a copy
of a work protected under Title 17, even if such actions involve circumven-
tion of additional forms of technological protection measures."2' The Senate
agrees with the House, using essentially similar language in its own
Report. °7 The House concludes by expressly stating that under this
subsection, "an individual would not be able to circumvent in order to gain
unauthorized access to a work, but would be able to do so in order to make
fair use of a work which he or she has acquired lawfully."208 This conclusion
is important for two reasons. First, it is evidence that the drafters of the
DMCA contemplated the existence and exercise of fair use under the terms
of the DMCA, specifically § 1201 (a) (1). Second, it shows the intent of the
drafters to allow an individual who has lawfully acquired a work to
circumvent the technological copy protections on that work so that he is able
to make fair use of it.
201 See Nimmer, supra note 197, at 684.
M 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(1)(A).
2r0 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29 (1998).
24 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001).
Mo5 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 17 (1998).
206 Id.
M7 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 28.
2 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17.
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2. THE BAN ON TRAFFICKING: SECTION 1201 (A) (2)
Section 1201(a) (2) is designed to prohibit "creating and making available
certain technologies, products and services used, developed or advertised to
defeat technological protections against unauthorized access to a work. "
It provides that:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title; or (C) is marketed by that
person or another acting in concert with that person with that
person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title.210
This subsection "supplements the prohibition against the act of
circumvention in paragraph (a)(1)." 211 It "is drafted carefully to target 'black
boxes,' and to ensure that legitimate multipurpose devices can continue to
be made and sold."2 2
Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) have been artificially segregated here for
organizational reasons and for ease of understanding. As a practical matter
however, because both prohibition provisions fall under § 1201(a), and
because (a)(2) "supplements" (a)(1) by providing "meaningful protection
and enforcement," they must be read jointly.
3. ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS: SECTION 1201(B) (1)
The purpose of § 1201(b)(1) is to protect a copyright holder's use of
technological protection measures to protect his rights under Title 17 by
prohibiting the manufacture or sale of the technological means to overcome
2W Id. at 18.
210 17 U.S.CA S 1201 (a)(2) (2007).
211 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18.
212 Id.
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those protections and thereby facilitate copyright infringement.213 It provides
that:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by
a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; (B)
has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than
to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a
work or a portion thereof; or (C) is marketed by that person or
another acting in concert with that person with that person's
knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof.214
Notice the substantially similar language to subsection (a) (2), except that the
phrase "effectively controls access to a work protected under this title" is
replaced in each of its three instances with the phrase, "effectively protects
a right of a copyright owner under this title." The focus of subsection (b)(1)
is the circumvention of technologies designed to permit access to a work but
also to prevent copying or otherwise infringing a copyright, while the focus
of subsection (a)(2) is the circumvention of technology designed to prevent
access to a work 215 This subsection generally applies to those technological
measures employed to protect the interest of a copyright owner in his work
and does not, by itself, prohibit the circumvention of effective technological
copyright protection measures.216 This subsection is applicable when a
person obtains authorized access to a copyrighted work protected by a
technological measure the copyright holder of the work has put in place.217
4. OTHER RIGHTS NOT AFFECTED
Section 1201(c)(1) expressly states that "[n]othing in this section shall
affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement,
213 Id. at 19.
214 17 U.S.C. S 1201(b) (2007).
215 See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001).
216 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29 (1998).
217 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 19.
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including fair use, under this title."218 Subsection (c)(1) "is intended to
ensure that none of the provisions in section 1201 affect the existing legal
regime established in the Copyright Act and case law interpreting that
statute."
219
The court in 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc.2  quotes Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley2 ' with approval when it construes this subsection to
"ensure [] that the DMCA is not read to prohibit the 'fair use' of information
just because that information was obtained in a manner made illegal by the
DMCA."m
C. Criticisms of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
There has been no shortage of criticism leveled at § 1201. Much of that
criticism has been directed at its perceived or actual lack of protection for
fair use.223 Even courts interpreting the anti-circumvention and anti-
trafficking provisions of § 1201 expressed concern that they could under-
mine the principles of fair use." 4
At least one commentator is urging that care "be taken to distinguish the
ban on trafficking from the similarly worded additional violations,"' as the
legislative history reveals that "'the two sections are not interchangeable, and
many devices will be subject to challenge only under one of the sub-
sections.'"226 And at least one other commentator is already suggesting that
the distinctions between § 1201(a) and (b) are blurred because ofjudicial
218 17 U.S.C. S.1201(c)(1) (2007).
219 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 20; see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 30 (expressing the same
intent using near-identical language).
2 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
221 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
M 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001)).
W See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Userfom the
DMCA's Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 111 (2005) (arguing that none of the balancing
measures set forth in S 1201 effectively protected fair use); see also Nimmer, supra note 197, at 693
("Future marketplace realities could dictate a different outcome, resulting in less access, rather than
more, to copyrighted materials that are important to education, scholarship, and other socially vital
endeavors."); see also JeffSharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. BUS. LJ. 1 (2002) (arguing that
the anticircumvention and antitrafficking provisions in S 1201 will eventually strangle the concept of
academic fair use and lead to a situation where everything must be licensed by the content providers).
224 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,322 (2000) ("The use of
technological means ofcontrolling access to a copyrighted work may affect the ability to make fair uses
of the work.").
ns Nimmer, supra note 197, at 689.
22 See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998)).
2008]
206 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:171
merger of the two provisions.z 7 While there are undoubtedly any number
of ways in which § 1201(a) and (b) may become entangled, this Note
attempts to keep them as distinct as possible.
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR FAIR USE UNDER THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Section 1201(a): Fair Use Based on Purpose and Intent
1. SECTION 1201 (A) (2): LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PURPOSE
Section 1201(a)(2) contains three prohibitions. The first prohibits
trafficking in any product that "is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title."228 The second prohibits
trafficking in any product that "has only limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title." 29 The third
prohibits trafficking in any technology that "is marketed by that person or
another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for
use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access
to a work protected under this title."230
The House Judiciary Committee states that the purpose of these three
prohibitions is "to provide meaningful protection and enforcement of the
copyright owner's right to control access to his or her copyrighted work."23'
In order to provide this protection, subsection (a)(2) "supplements the
prohibition against the act of circumvention in paragraph (a)(1) with
prohibitions on creating and making available certain technologies, products
and services used, developed or advertised to defeat technological protec-
tions against unauthorized access to a work."
2
227 See generally R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the
Structure ofAnticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 619 (2003) (exploring the possible impact on
copyright holders, businesses, the law, and consumers of combined access and rights controls in light
of the different levels of statutory protection afforded to the controls).
Z! 17 U.S.C.A. S 1201(a)(2)(A) (2007).
29 s 1201(a)(2)(B).
Mo 1201(a)(2)(C).
231 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 10 (1998).
232 Id. (emphasis added); S. REp. No. 105-190, at 28 (1998) (employing precisely the same
language as the House Report).
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2. SECTION 1201(A): PROHIBITING UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS,
PERMITTING AUTHORIZED ACCESS
I. SECTION 1201(A): PERMITTING AUTHORIZED ACCESS
Notice that both Judiciary Committees agree that the purpose of sub-
section (a)(2) is to supplement subsection (a)(1) by prohibiting
"unauthorized access to a work." But what does Congress mean when it says
"unauthorized access"? Section 1201(a) defines the phrases "circumvent a
technological measure" 3 and "effectively controls access to a work,"2 but
it does not define the phrase "unauthorized access to a work." This is hardly
surprising, as prohibiting "unauthorized access" is Congress' purpose in
implementing subsection (a) (2) and defining these two phrases in the statute
is but a means to achieve that purpose.
To define "unauthorized access," it is necessary to explore further the
legislative history and the relationship between subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).
First, recall subsection (a)(1) declares that "[n]o person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title." 5 However, the House expressly states its intent that
"[p] aragraph (a) (1) does not apply to the subsequent actions of a person once
he or she has obtained authorized access to a copy of a work protected under
Title 17."236 This statement makes logical sense when read in conjunction
with the stated purpose of the three prohibitions found in subsection (a)(2).
Since the purpose of those prohibitions is to prevent "unauthorized access"
to a work, it rationally follows that if access to a work is indeed authorized,
then it is not prohibited by the terms of subsection (a)(2). Put another way,
because subsection (a) (2) is included in the statute to "supplement"
subsection (a)(1) with "meaningful protection[s]," if subsection (a)(1) does
not apply once an individual has obtained authorized access to a work, then
the three prohibitions found in subsection (a) (2) cannot prohibit that person
from accessing the work. With its intent expressly stated, the House then
defines its scope: "[A]n individual would not be able to circumvent in order
to gain unauthorized access to a work, but would be able to do so in order to
make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired lawfully."1
7
233 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(3)(A).
B4 1201(a)(3)(B).
2 3 1201(a)(1)(A).
M See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998) (emphases added).
2 See id. (emphasis added). The Senate Committee implicitly agrees, stating "[t]his paragraph
does not apply to the subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to a
copy of a work protected under title 17 [sic], even ifsuch actions involve circumvention of other types
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ii. THE MANIFESTATION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT IN SECTION
1201(A) (2) (A), (B), AND (C)
The significance of this statement is hard to underestimate. It is the
bridge that spans not only the fair use gap between the concepts of
infringement and circumvention but also the fair use gap between the anti-
circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions. It is Congress' 38 express
intent that, so long as an individual has lawfully acquired a work, that
individual may circumvent in order to make fair use of that work. But,
keeping in mind that the purpose of subsection (a)(2) is to supplement
subsection (a) (1) by providing protection against "unauthorized access," this
intent is meaningless unless it is manifested in subsection (a) (2).
Each of the three prohibitions in subsection (a) (2) refers to a distinct act
regarding circumvention devices.239 However, it is crucial to recognize that
each of these prohibitions applies only to "a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title." 24° While
§ 1201(a) defines "circumvent a technological measure" and effectively
controls access to a work,"24' it does not define "a work protected under this
title." The legislative reports are similarly silent.242 Section 101243 does not
define "a work protected under this title" among its laundry list of
definitions, but § 102, entitled "Subject matter of copyright," does provide
that "[c] opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium ofexpression." 244 Section
106 gives to copyright holders the "exclusive rights," protected by § 102.
However, in doing so, it makes those rights "[s]ubject to section[] 107, " 24'
which by its very terms states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is
not an infringement of copyright."24 The Supreme Court explained the
relationship between these sections before:
of technological protection measures." See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 28 (1998). The other technological
protection measures found in § 1201(a) are, ofcourse, the three prohibitions found in subsection (a)(2).
Zu H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18.
239 See 17 U.S.C.A S 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C) (2007); see supra Part IV.E.2.i.
240 17 U.S.C.A. S 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C) (emphasis added).
241 S 1201(a)(3)(A), (B).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 19; S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29 (1998).
243 17 U.S.C.A. S 101. This section, along with subsequent sections, is applicable as a result of
S 1201(c). See S 1201(c); see also supra Part IV.B.4.
24 17 U.S.C.A. 102(a). Needless to say, movies obviously fall within the scope of this section.
2s See S 106.
246 See S 107.
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"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by
using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work. . . "is an
infringer of the copyright." Conversely, anyone who is authorized
by the copyright owner to use the copyrighted work in a way
specified in the statute or who makes fair use of the work is not an
infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.247
In light of the lack of any definition for the phrase "a work protected
under this title," this relationship between sections 102, 106, and 107 must
be interpreted to mean that a work is not protected under Title 17 if a fair
use is made of it. This idea is not so radical as it may first seem. The Court
has previously interpreted § 107 to mean that "[a]ny individual may
reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use;' the copyright owner does not
possess the exclusive right to such a use." 248 Moreover, every case arising
under copyright law in which fair use is claimed as a defense 249 implicitly
recognizes it. In bringing suit, the copyright holder wants the court either
to recognize or enforce one or more of his exclusive rights in his work for
that use. But if the court finds the use to be fair, the copyright holder has
none of his exclusive rights and therefore, no ability to enjoin the use or
receive damages or compensation for the use. To be clear, the scope of this
interpretation absolutely does not extend past the scope of fair use (subject
to any other statutory exceptions). Once outside of the fair use exception,
Title 17 does protect the copyright holder's exclusive rights.
Therefore, the definition of the phrase "a work protected under this
title" is properly meant to exclude fair uses, because copyright holders are
not protected against fair uses of their works under Title 17. Consequently,
Congress' intent to allow circumvention under subsection (a)(1) for fair use
purposes is manifested in each of subsection (a) (2)'s three prohibitions, as
a limitation on the scope of those prohibitions.2 Because fair use falls
247 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (quoting 17 U.S.C.
S 501(a)).
248 See id.
249 Or, more precisely, every case arising under copyright law in which fair use is used as a
defense, except those in which fair use is claimed as a defense to the provisions of§ 1201 (because those
provisions have been wrongly interpreted as not subject to fair use) implicitly recognizes it.
2W The presence of subsection (a)(3)(B) is irrelevant and does not alter this analysis or
conclusion. It defines how a "technological measure" "effectively controls access to a work." See 17
U.S.C. S 1201(a)(3)(C) (2007). However, this Note focuses its analysis on the completely different issue
of what it means to be "a work protected under this title."
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outside the scope of these three prohibitions, by definition Congress cannot
prohibit products or activity that result in fair use."'
3. THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT FOR FAIR USE
The House Report stated that an individual would be able to circumvent
"in order to make fair use of a work."" This statement, combined with the
language excluding fair use from subsection (a)(2)'s prohibitions,
necessitates that an individual show intent to make fair use of a work in
order to circumvent the access controls.
In theory, the intent to make fair use is not the same as actually making
fair use. Thus, two possibilities are present. It is possible to intend to make
fair use of a work but ultimately infringe upon it, and it is possible to intend
to make a fair use of a work and ultimately make fair use of it.
4. THE REQUIREMENT OF LAWFUL ACQUISITION FOR FAIR USE
The House Report stated that an individual would be able to circumvent
to make fair use of a work "which he or she has acquired lawfully."253 This
requirement obviously excludes things like theft or fraud. In the larger
context, it seems to suggest things like purchase or assignment.
B. Section 1201(b): Fair Use
1. SECTION 1201(B) (1): PURPOSE AND APPLICATION
Section 1201(b)(1) has three provisions that prohibit trafficking in
anything that "is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or
a portion thereof,"254 anything that "has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent protection afforded by
a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner
under this title in a work or a portion thereof,"25 or anything that "is
25 Cf. Lexmark Int'l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 552 (6th Cir. 2004)
(Merritt, J., concurring) ("Congress ... sought to reach those who circumvented protective measures
'for the purpose' of pirating works protected by the copyright statute.").
252 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998).
253 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18.
5 17 U.S.C.A S 1201(b)(1)(A) (2007).
255 S 1201(b)(1)(B).
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marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person or
with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded
by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof. "2
The House and Senate agree that the purpose of § 1201(b)(1) is "to
provide meaningful protection and enforcement of copyright owners' use of
technological protection measures to protect their rights under title 17 [sic]
by prohibiting the act of making or selling the technological means to
overcome these protections [employed by the copyright holder] and thereby
facilitate copyright infringement." 7 Yet, they cannot agree as to when §
1201(b) applies. The Senate believes it "applies to those technological
measures employed by a copyright owner that effectively protect his or her
copyright rights in a work. " 258 Meanwhile, the House believes it "applies
when a person has obtained authorized access to a copy... of a work, but
the copyright owner has put in place technological measures that effectively
protect his or her right under Title 17 to control or limit further use of the
copyrighted work."259 The difference is actually quite striking. The language
employed shows the House believes that § 1201(b) applies to a situation that
arises only upon certain facts,26 while the Senate believes that § 1201(b)
applies to the access control measures themselves.26'
The statute itself indicates that the view of the Senate has prevailed. Each
of the three provisions of subsection (b)(1) prohibits doing some act with
respect to "a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner under this title in a work or portion thereof" 262 Like
subsection (a)(2) however, the phrase of importance is not defined. The
question is, what exactly constitutes "a right of a copyright owner under this
title"? The legislative reports are silent on the issue. It is irrelevant that the
statute defines the phrase "effectively protects a right of a copyright owner
under this title."263 That provision is concerned with the ability of the
technological measure to protect the work, not the rights it is supposed to
actually protect.
2% 1201(b)(1)(C).
2S7 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29 (1998); See also H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 19 (1998).
2Ms S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29.
2S9 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 19 (1998).
260 Id.
261 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 29.
262 See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2007).
23 See S 1201(b)(2)(B). This provision is slightly ambiguous at first. To be clear, the statute uses
"prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits" in relation to third parties, not to the copyright holder. That is,
the technological measure "prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits" the ability of third parties to exercise
the right of a copyright holder, not the ability of a copyright holder to exercise his own right.
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2. SECTION 1201(B) (2) (B): THE RIGHT OF A COPYRIGHT HOLDER
Answering the question "what constitutes a right of a copyright owner
under this title" under S 1201(b) (2) results in the same process and answer
as the question of "what constitutes a work protected under this title" under
5 1201(a) (2) .264 That is to say, in light of the lack of any definition for the
phrase "a right of a copyright owner under this title," the relationship
between sections 102, 106, and 107 must be interpreted to mean that a
copyright holder does not have a right in the fair use of one of his works.
The same justifications and reasons that applied to interpreting "a work
protected under this title" apply to "a right of a copyright holder." It is not
a radical idea, but rather implicitly recognized in all fair use defenses.
Moreover, it makes logical sense. If copyright holders continued to have
rights in fair uses of their works, or if a fair use continued to be protected
under Title 17, then the doctrine of fair use would effectively cease to exist.
Some might object that there is a difference between interpreting "a
work protected under this title" and "a right of a copyright owner under this
title." They would be partially correct. There is a difference, but it arises out
of the respective purposes of S 1201(a) and (b), and the end result is the
same. The Senate Report explains that "[s]ubsection (b) applies to those
technological measures employed by a copyright owner that effectively
protect his or her copyright rights in a work, as opposed to those
technological protection measures covered by subsection (a), which prevent
unauthorized access to a copyrighted work."2 s The difference is one of
degree, not substance. Section 1201(b) contemplates specific uses of
technological protection measures by specific copyright holders, so its terms
are drafted in language such as "a right of a copyright owner under this title."
Meanwhile, Section 1201 (a) contemplates technological protection measures
generally, so its own terms are drafted in language such as "controls access
to a work protected under this title."
When the Court explains that "[a]ny individual may reproduce a
copyrighted work for a 'fair use;' the copyright owner does not possess the
exclusive right to such a use,"2 1 it is speaking on both levels. Although
Section 1201(a) and (b) were drafted on two different levels, the end result
is the same; a fair use of a work is excepted.
2" See supra Part V.A.2.ii.
2's S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29.
266 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984); see also supra Part
V.A.2.ii.
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3. SECTION 1201 (B)(2): REQUIREMENT OF INTENT FOR FAIR USE
There is no explicit prohibition against circumvention of technological
copyright protection measures in § 1201(b). 27 Its terms prohibit only
circumvention of access control technology, fair use excepted. But these
prohibitions are similar to those of§ 1201 (b)(1) in that while circumvention
for fair use lies outside the scope of the language, circumvention for other
uses does not. Therefore, one must show intent to make fair use in order to
circumvent the technological protection measures.
VI. THE FIRST GENERATION OF CASES UNDER THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Reimerdes and Corley
The first significant interpretation of § 1201 was Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes,2 s which was affirmed under the name Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley.269 This Note deals largely with Reimerdes instead of Corley
because it provides a fuller and deeper analysis of the law and because it is
affirmed in toto.Y Whereas Reimerdes gives nine pages of analysis and
discussion of the relevant copyright law,"I Corley provides less than two.272
This is not to say that the Note will ignore or discount Corley. Rather, it will
only refer to it on issues to which it bears particular relevance or insight.
However, because both opinions contain significant discussions on legal
issues unrelated to, or outside the subject of, this Note, the discussion and
analysis will be confined to matters relating to § 1201 and § 107.
The underlying facts of Reimerdes and Corley are relatively simple. In
September 1999, a fifteen-year-old Norwegian computer hacker and two
other unidentified individuals created a computer program called DeCSS,
which was capable of breaking the CSS encryption algorithm movie studios
used to provide protection against unauthorized DVD copying. None of
these three had permission or authorization to decrypt the CSS algorithm273
This program was put on the internet and in November 1999, defendant
Corley began both offering the program for download on his website and
267 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29.
2 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
S 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
-, See id. at 459-60.
271 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp 2d 294,315-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
2 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443-45 (2d Cir. 2001).
23 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
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linking to other websites that offered the program for download.274 Corley's
was one of hundreds of websites that offered DeCSS for download.2s
Several movie studios, through the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA), sent out cease and desist letters and filed suit against Corley under
the DMCA in January 2000. 76
The court began by explaining that because Corley was accused not of
actually infringing a copyright, but of making it possible for others to bypass
a DVD's access controls by posting DeCSS to his website, the principal
provision at issue was § 1201(a) (2).277 It should probably come as no surprise
that the first issue the court analyzed was Corley's act of posting DeCSS on
his website. It quickly concluded as "inescapable facts" that CSS is a
technological means that "effectively" controls access to a DVD, that the
singular function of DeCSS is to circumvent CSS's encryption scheme, and
that Corley offered and provided DeCSS by posting it on his website
The court then considered whether Corley's actions fell into any of the
statutory exceptions. As the focus of this Note is on fair use, the analysis will
focus on the fair use exception. Corley argues that he posted DeCSS to his
website simply as a means to enable its users to make fair uses of their own
DVDs and that the DMCA cannot properly be construed to make it difficult
or impossible to make any fair use of CSS-encrypted DVDs; thus, the
DMCA does not reach their activities.279 The court observed that Corley
"focused on a significant point. Access control measures such as CSS do
involve some risk of preventing lawful as well as unlawful uses of
copyrighted material." °
The court first looked at the language of § 107 and found that it
"provides in critical part that certain uses of copyrighted works that
otherwise would be wrongful are not infringements of copyright," and then
repeated that Corley was "not here sued for copyright infringement. [He is]
sued for offering and providing technology designed to circumvent
technological measures that control access to copyrighted works. ",21' The
court implicitly concluded that "[i] fCongress had meant the fair use defense
to apply to such actions, it would have said so." m
27 Id. at 312.
275 Id. at 311.
76 Id. at 312.
zn Id. at 316.
Z78 Id. at 319.





The problem is Congress did say so. The House Report expressly
contemplates that under § 1201(a), "an individual would not be able to
circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a work, but would be able
to do so in order to make fair use of a work. "28 The court does not recognize
that the scope of§ 1201(a)(2)(C) does not encompass fair use. 2s4 So while
the court is technically correct in saying that Corley cannot directly claim
fair use as a defense, it errs in concluding that he may not, by virtue of
legislative intent, claim that he intends fair use by posting DeCSS to his
website. This is effectively what Corley did, when he claimed that "those
who would make fair use of technologically protected copyrighted works
need means, such as DeCSS, of circumventing access controls measures not
for piracy, but to make lawful use of those works."215 Whether Corley
actually did act with intent to make fair use is a question that cannot be
answered, either from Reimerdes or Corley. There is simply not enough
information available in the opinion, which is unsurprising considering that
the court did not consider intent to make fair use to be an issue.
Believing that fair use is not recognized in § 1201(a), the court goes on
to describe three elements of the balance that Congress struck among
competing interests in drafting the DMCA. The first element is the
limitation of § 1201(a)(1)'s prohibition "of the act of circumvention to the
act itself, so as not to 'apply to subsequent actions of a person once he or she
has obtained authorized access to a copy of a copyrighted work.' ' 236 By so
limiting the scope of the prohibition, Congress "left 'the traditional defenses
to copyright infringement, including fair use fully applicable' provided 'the
access is authorized.'" 287 The court is correct in describing the limited nature
of § 1201(a)(1). Of course, the court would be even more correct in
describing that § 1201 (a) (1) is also limited by the concept of fair use.2S
The second element is irrelevant to this Note's purpose. The third
element Congress considered was a series of exceptions (sections 1201(d),
(f), (g), and (j)) "for certain uses that Congress thought 'fair.' 2 9 To call
these exceptions "fair" in an attempt to equate or analogize them to the fair
use doctrine is inaccurate. The court may think that these uses are fair, but
Congress did not. While these subsections do in fact create exceptions, the
statute and the legislative reports do not use the phrase "fair use," or even the
M3 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998) (emphasis added).
n4 See supra Part VA2.ii.
M Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
2% See id. at 323 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998)).
V See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18).
2 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18; see supra Part VA2.i.
2s9 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
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words "fair" or "use" in any way in that may indicate that these provisions
were meant as fair use provisions; indeed, the only time "fair" appears in §
1201 at all is in subsection (c) (1). Moreover, the language of the subsections
themselves seems to suggest against a finding that Congress considered these
exceptions to be "fair." Section 107 is nonexclusive and flexible in its
terms, 29 and the Supreme Court stressed on more than one occasion the
importance of this flexibility in adjudicating fair use cases. 291 It thus seems
reasonable, especially in light of the legislative recognition given to fair use
in drafting the DMCA,2 2 that if the drafters wrote these subsections to
constitute "fair" use as Reimerdes asserts, it would have included some
modicum of flexibility to circumvent in the provisions. However, this is not
the case. Instead, the language of the subsections in question is exclusive and
strict.
293
As presented by the court, with no fair use limitation on § 1201, these
balances noticeably skew to the side of the copyright holders. Even assuming
for the present argument that § 1201(d), (f), (g), and (j) constitute uses that
are "fair," the balances still inevitably skew to the copyright holders. The
average individual could not raise a defense under S 1201(d) because it
applies only to nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions.
294
Most likely, he would also not be able to raise defenses under either S
1201(g) because encryption research' 5 requires a highly advanced and
developed knowledge of mathematics, or S 1201(f) and (j) because both the
2o See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 71, at 66 ("Beyond a very broad statutory explanation
of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine
to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.").
291 See, e.g., Campbellv. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,577 (1994) ("The fair use doctrine
thus 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion,
it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.'" (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. S 1201(d)(1) (2007) ("A copy of a work to which access has been gained
... may not be retained longer than necessary to make such good faith determination."); § 1201(0(1)
(An individual may reverse engineer "for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements
of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer
program with other programs."). Subsections (g) and (j) are slightly more flexible than subsections (d)
and (0), as different factors are provided to determine whether actions under those subsections are lawful.
See § 1201(g)(2); S 12010)(3). However, these factors are still much more narrowly confined in theory
and practice than the factors to constitute a "fair" use in any sense of the term.
294 See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(d)(1).
2% See generally id. S 1201(g) (stating that "encryption research" includes activities necessary to
identify and analyze "encryption technology," which is defined as the "scrambling and descrambling of
information using mathematical formulas or algorithms").
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ability to reverse engineer' and test computer systems for security297 require
a highly advanced and developed knowledge in computer science and the
acquisition of expensive software programs. In other words, the scope of
these exceptions is so narrow and specialized that even if they were to
constitute "fair" uses, the vast majority of people could never raise them as
defenses because most people will never reverse engineer a computer
program, security test a computer, 29 or do encryption research. It can hardly
benefit the public good to take away the fair use defenses that the majority
of people would use but leave four that only a small fraction of the
population would ever use.
Compare these limited exceptions on uses that are "fair" to the
limitation on the act of circumvention. This limitation serves not as some
kind of restraint upon the law or a restriction upon its scope but instead as
an extra ground for civil or criminal liability. Suppose, for example, that the
Roy Orbison song "Oh, Pretty Woman" in Campbell was protected with
some kind of technological protection measure similar to CSS which
allowed an individual to listen to the song, but not copy it. Campbell
nevertheless decides to make a parody of this song, so he uses a program
similar to DeCSS to copy some of the instrument tracks. Acuff-Rose then
sues Campbell, not only for copyright infringement, but also for
unauthorized circumvention under § 1201. Campbell can claim none of the
four exceptions that the court characterized as "fair." Moreover, even if the
actual use of the song is determined to be a fair use, Campbell still faces civil
and criminal liability for circumventing the song's access protections. For
the court to avoid absurd and unjust situations such as these, it need only
accept that, consistent with the legislative history and statutory
interpretation, fair use is an exception to S 1201.
Corley's final argument is that DeCSS might be used to gain access to
a copyrighted work, in order to make a fair use of that work, and is thus
protected under Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.' The court rejects
this argument on two different grounds. It first characterizes Sony as an
infringement case, in which "the only question was whether the manufac-
turers could be held liable for infringement by those who purchased
equipment from them in circumstances in which there were many non-
infringing uses for their equipment.""° In Corley's case, however, the issue
2% See generally S 1201(0.
2W See generally S 1201(j).
2W The context indicates that this type of security research constitutes much more than an
individual simply running the antivirus program that came with his computer. See id.
29 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
300 Id.
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is "whether the possibility of non-infringing fair use by someone who gains
access to a protected copyrighted work through a circumvention technology
distributed by the defendants saves the defendants from liability under
Section 1201."3°1 Second, even if Sony did apply, "it would not govern here"
because it "involved a construction of the Copyright Act that has been
overruled by the later enactment of the DMCA to the extent of any
inconsistency between Sony and the new statute." 3° Specifically, the court
says that "[t] he Sony test of "capability of substantial non-infringing uses,"
while still operative in cases claiming contributory infringement of
copyright, is not part of this legislation."
33
First, the court misinterprets the scope of Sony. To read it as only a
contributory infringement case is to construe justice Stevens' opinion much
too narrowly. The "only question" in Sony was not, as the court describes
the case, "whether the manufacturers could be held liable for infringement
by those who purchased equipment from them in circumstances in which
there were many noninfringing uses for their equipment. "3 This was a
question, but it was not the question. For Sony to be liable for contributory
infringement, the studios "have the burden of proving that users of the
Betamax have infringed their copyright."30 5 Fair use was raised as a defense
against infringement based on unauthorized time-shifting, 30 6 and the Court
considered it. The resulting case law is the Supreme Court's first
interpretation of the newly codified § 107. As a result, Sony is just as much
a fair use case as it is a contributory infringement case.
Second, just because Sony's "substantial noninfringing uses test" was
overruled by the DMCA, it does not automatically follow that Sony does not
apply. It is important to remember that Corley was accused of trafficking in
circumvention measures in violation of § 1201(a)(2), not of infringement,
and that the court errs in not recognizing that the scope of § 1201(a) (2)'s
language offers an exception for fair use.3 7 To avoid liability under the
proper interpretation of § 1201(a)(2), Corley must show that his intent in
posting DeCSS was to make fair use. Proving an individual's own fair use
intent is not even remotely related to showing that a product capable of
infringement has substantial noninfringing uses. Thus, if under a proper
interpretation of § 1201(a)(2) all Corley must prove is his fair use intent,
301 Id.
302 Id.
M3 Id. at 324 n.170.
3M4 See id. at 323.
305 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984).
3o6 See id. at 420-21.
M7 See supra Part VA2.i-ii.
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then there is no reason why he cannot cite to Sony in support of his fair use
argument.
Reasoning thus, the district court erroneously concludes that Corley's
fair use argument is "entirely without merit."308 Under a proper
interpretation of § 1201(a), however, the court would have examined
Corley's intent in posting DeCSS to his website. That is, did Corley intend
for DeCSS to make fair uses of DVD, or did he simply intend to pirate
them, or aid other people in pirating them?
B. United States v. Elcom
United States v. Elcom3°9 came two years after the Reimerdes decision. Its
facts are also simple and straightforward, though it differs from Reimerdes and
321 Studios in three respects. First, defendant Elcom was criminally
prosecuted, not civilly sued, under the DMCA.31° Second, the controversy
arises from computer software, not DVDs. Adobe Systems sold a program
called the Adobe eBook Reader.31' This program did two things. It allowed
people to purchase and read electronic books (ebooks) on their computers,
and it allowed the publishers of the ebooks to set certain usage restrictions
on them, such as whether they could be printed or transferred to another
computer.312 Elcom sold a Windows-based software program known as the
Advanced eBook Processor (AEBPR) that allowed a user to remove these
use restrictions and enabled the buyer "to engage in 'fair use' of an ebook
without infringing the copyright laws." 313 Elcom was indicted for violating
§ 1201(b), 314 and this case came as a result of his motion to dismiss.
315
Early in the opinion, the court notes the inherent tension present in §
1201(b) due to its "use of the phrase 'effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner"' in its definition of a prohibited device, "because the rights
of a copyright owner are intertwined with the rights of others."3 16 For a brief
moment, the court seems as though it is going to seize upon the notion that
M8 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
3 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
310 See 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2007).
311 Ekom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
312 Id. at 1117-18.
313 Id. at 1118.
314 Id. at 1119.
35s Id. at 1117.
316 See id. at 1121.
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copyright holders have no rights in fair uses of their works,317 yet it ends its
theoretical discussion by quoting the four fair use factors in S 107.318
Elcom seizes on this tension in his defense, which is the third way in
which this case is different from either Reimerdes or 321 Studios. He does not
present a fair use defense. Rather, he argues that under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, S 1201(b) "is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to [him] because it does not clearly delineate the conduct which it
prohibits.
319
Elcom makes a fairly intricate argument. He begins by reasoning that
both "the legislative history and the language of the DMCA establish that
Congress did not prohibit the act of circumventing usage control techno-
logies."320 Because Congress did not prohibit this act, "it also did not ban all
tools which might be used to circumvent usage control technologies."
32 1
Consequently, "Congress sought to prohibit only those tools which are
intended to be used to circumvent usage control technologies for the
purpose of copyright infringement" and thus, S 1201(b) "does not provide
a constitutionally adequate notice of this prohibition."322 The government
argues in reply that § 1201(b) prohibits all tools that circumvent usage
control, regardless of whether they are used to facilitate infringement or
enable fair use.3 23 Consequently, the court must "determine whether the
DMCA bans trafficking in all circumvention tools, regardless of whether
they are designed to enable fair use or to facilitate infringement, or whether
instead the statute bans only those tools that circumvent use restrictions for
the purpose of facilitating copyright infringement." 324 In the context of
Elcom's due process argument, "[i]f all circumvention tools are banned,
[then his] void-for-vagueness challenge necessarily fails."
325
Elcom is undoubtedly correct in arguing that Congress did not prohibit
circumvention of usage control technologies under S 1201(b); the Senate
Report expressly confirms this argument.326 He is also correct in the next
317 See supra Part V.B.2.
318 Ekom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
319 Id. at 1122. This is similar to Reimerdes and 321 Studios. However, Elcom also claims several




323 See id. at 1123.
324 Id.
325 See id.
326 S. REp. No. 105-190, at 29 (1998) ("[W]here a copy control technology is employed to
prevent the unauthorized reproduction ofa work, the circumvention of that technology would not itself
be actionable under section 1201.").
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stage of his argument, that Congress "did not ban all tools which might be
used to circumvent usage control technologies." However, his underlying
reasoning is faulty. Elcom reasons that Congress did not ban all
circumvention tools because Congress did not ban the act of circumventing.
This argument may be logical standing alone, but it is invalid within the
context of Title 17. Instead, Congress did not ban all circumvention tools
because Congress did not ban fair use. This much is evident from the
language of§ 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C). 327 Elcom's reasoning erases fair use from
§ 1201(b). Without fair use, the logical structure of the statute implodes on
itself. The results of this will be seen very shortly.
Despite his faulty reasoning, however, Elcom correctly arrives at the
third stage of his argument, that Congress sought to prohibit only those
tools intended to circumvent for the purpose of infringement. Until this
point, Elcom's argument is nearly identical to the one advanced in Part V of
this Note, the only difference being the stated reasons why Congress did not
ban all circumvention tools. This is where Elcom's proverbial house of cards
comes crashing down. Because Congress only sought to prohibit
circumvention tools intended to infringe, he argues, § 1201(b) does not
provide an adequate notice of this prohibition because there is no way to
know which tools are lawful. Of course the statute does not provide Elcom
with adequate notice, because he has removed fair use from his analysis. The
cornerstone-like status of fair use stems, in turn, from its requirement to
show intent to make fair use. That is, if an individual circumvents intending
to make fair use, then he knows he is not prohibited from doing so, because
the provisions that otherwise would prohibit him do not encompass fair use.
Likewise, if an individual circumvents intending to infringe, then he knows
he is prohibited from doing so, because the provisions that prohibit him
encompass infringement. If anything, the faulty reasoning in Elcom's
argument shows the importance and necessity of intent to make a fair use to
§ 1201(b)(1) and by implication, § 1201(a)(2).a~
The court holds that § 1201(b) "imposes a blanket ban on trafficking in
or the marketing of any device that circumvents use restrictions."329 It reads
sections 1201(b)(2)(B) and 106 together, concluding that the statutory
language is clear enough in not distinguishing circumvention devices
designed for fair use purposes from circumvention devices designed for
infringement purposes.330 Because there is no ambiguity in the language, it
327 See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2007) ("[PJrotects a right ofa copyright owner under this
title... "); see also supra Part V.B.2.
328 See supra Part V.B.2.; see supra Part V.A.2.ii.
329 Ekom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
330 Id.
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is unnecessary to consider the legislative intent behind the provisions in
question.33' Denying Elcom's motion for dismissal, the court writes that
"[flair use of a copyrighted work continues to be permitted, as does
circumventing restrictions for the purpose of engaging in a fair use, even
though engaging in certain fair uses of digital works may be made more
difficult if tools to circumvent use restrictions cannot be readily obtained.
332
The court correctly begins its analysis by reading § 106 in conjunction
with § 1201(b) to determine the meaning of "right of a copyright owner."
The court interprets § 1201(b) (2)(B) in conjunction with § 106 to mean that
"a technological measure effectively protects a right of a copyright owner...
if ... in the ordinary course of its operation, [it] prevents, restricts, or
otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under [Section
106].,, 33 The court errs however, in not determining the meaning of the
"right of a copyright owner under this title." Thus, the court only considers
how the provisions serve the copyright owner, not how they serve the
greater public. That is, the court recognizes that § 1201(b)(2)(B) prevents
individuals from exercising the rights of a copyright holder, but it doesn't
recognize that a fair use of a work, present in the phrase "under this title,"
prevents the copyright holder from exercising his rights against the people.
Thus, it erroneously concludes that the statute does not distinguish devices
designed to circumvent for fair use from those designed to circumvent for
infringement.
C. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc.
321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc. 33 was decided four years after Reimerdes,
in the same district as Elcom. As of this writing, it was also the last significant
decision to interpret § 1201 in the context ofDVD decrypting software. This
case came before the court on seven different motions made by defendants
and counterclaimants, including a motion for partial summaryjudgment and
a motion for dismissal.3 5 The facts, however, are simple and unobtrusive.
321 Studios sold two software programs, DVD Copy Plus and DVD-X
Copy, which allowed users to make backup copies of commercial DVDs by
circumventing the DVD's CSS encryption.336 In 2002, 321 Studios filed a
complaint for declaratory relief, seeking ajudgment that its actions in selling
331 Id.
332 See id. at 1125.
333 Id. at 1124.
334 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
335 See id. at 1090.
336 See id. at 1089.
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the two software programs either did not violate the DMCA and the
Copyright Act or that certain provisions of the DMCA were invalid.337
Naturally, the movie studios (referred to here as MGM for sake of simplicity
and clarity) who owned the copyrighted material objected to judgment in
favor of 321 Studios.338
The court first inquires into provisions specific to § 1201(a)(2). MGM
argues that 321 Studios' software violates each of the three prohibitions of
§ 1201 (a) (2) .339 321 Studios argues that it cannot violate § 1201 (a) (2) because
"circumvent by definition is done without the authority of the copyright
holder," and it "does have the authority of the copyright holder because its
product only works on original DVDs, and the purchaser of the DVD has
authority of the copyright holder to bypass CSS." 340 The court holds that
"the purchase of a DVD does not give the purchaser the authority of the
copyright holder to decrypt CSS."34 It explains that this argument is the
result of misreading § 1201(a)(3)(A), which "exempts from liability those
who would decrypt an encrypted DVD with the authority of a copyright
owner, not those who would view a DVD with the authority of a copyright
0 1342owner. " 4
Whether 321 Studios has misread § 1201(a)(3)(A) is irrelevant; it did not
have to read § 1201 (a)(3) (A) at.all. The 321 Studios court, like the Reimerdes
court, misread § 1201(a) by reading § 1201(a)(2) separately from §
1201(a)(1), not as supplementing it, as Congress intended. 343 By reading §
1201 (a) (2) separately from (a) (1), both 321 Studios and the court missed the
House's express intent that "an individual... would be able [to circumvent]
in order to make a fair use of a work which he or she has acquired
lawfully."344 Then, as long as acted with the requisite fair use intent in selling
its software, it would not have been liable under § 1201(a) (2) because of the
limitations on the scope of the language.345 In addition, 321 Studios would
not have to make the cumbersome argument that the purchaser of a DVD
has the authority of the DVD's copyright holder to decrypt the DVD.
The court next inquires into provisions specific to § 1201(b)(1). 321
Studios makes a three step argument: First, CSS is not a copy control
337 See id. at 1089-90.
338 See id. at 1090.
339 See id. at 1096.
34 See id.
341 Id.
342 Id. (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001)).
343 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 10 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 28 (1998); see supra
Part V.A.1.
3" See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18; see also supra Part V.A.2.i.
35 See supra Part V.A.2.ii.
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measure since it controls access to DVDs but does not prevent copying
DVDs; second, § 1201(b) (1) is concerned only with illegal copying; third,
because the programs circumvent only CSS, and CSS is not a copy control
measure, then § 1201 (b) (1) does not apply at all to it.' Concluding that 321
Studios both misreads the statute and misstates the purpose of CSS, the
court holds that CSS is a copy control scheme and, therefore, § 1201(b)(1)
does apply.' 4
321 Studios then argues that, even if § 1201(b)(1) does apply, its
software does not violate it "because the primary and intended use of the
software does not violate any right of the copyright holder."348 The court
responds by saying that the plain meaning of the statute "makes it clear that
its prohibition applies to the manufacturing, trafficking in and making of
devices that would circumvent encryption technology, not to the users of
such technology," and holds that the "downstream use" of the copyrighted
material is not a defense to § 1201(b)(1). 9
321 Studios may have started down the right street when it attempted to
argue that § 1201(b)(1) was only concerned with illegal copying, and the
primary use of its software did not violate any copyrights, but it soon turned
down a wrong alley. It also tried to make the exact same arguments about
CSS that Corley did in Reimerdes, and, as in Reimerdes, the court rejected
them.3 °
321 Studios should have argued that because the prohibitions in §
1201(2)(b) only protect "a right of a copyright owner under" Title 17 and
because the fair use of a work lies outside of the copyright holder's rights,
the language of the three prohibitions does not encompass fair uses of a
work.351
321 Studios then argues that its software does not violate § 1201(b) (2)
because it does not "circumvent" encryption. 3 2 The court replies that "while
321's software does use the authorized key to access the DVD, it does not
have authority to use this key, as licensed DVD players do, and it therefore
avoids and bypasses CSS," and holds generally that § 1201(b) (1) does apply
to 321's DVD copying software.3 3
34 See 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096-97 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
3 Id. at 1097.
30 See id.
39 See id. at 1097-98.
350 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,317-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
351 See supra Part V.B.2.
352 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
3 See id.
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The court then inquires into the common provisions of§ 1201 (a) (2) and
§ 1201 (b) (1). With regard to the first provision ofboth subsections, the court
holds that because part of 321's software is "solely for the purpose of
circumventing CSS, this portion of the software, therefore, violates 17
U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2)(A)."354 While 321 Studios claimed that this portion of
the software was just one feature out of many, the court responded that
"only that specific feature is challenged here, and all that it does and was
designed to do is to circumvent CSS."
315
With regard to the third provision of both subsections, 321 Studios
claims that the prohibition on advertising violated its First Amendment
rights. 356 The court simply responds that the First Amendment does not
protect commercial speech that involves illegal activity, and that it finds the
CSS circumnavigation portion of the software to be illegal.357
Aside from any possible fair use defenses via the scope of the statutory
language,58 this part of the court's opinion seems ominous for several
reasons, not the least of which being that the court considered the
prohibitions of S1201(a) and (b) together, not separately. Perhaps this is
only the beginning of the judicial blurring of these provisions.359 This
blurring is especially troublesome in light of the fact that an individual can
be sued civilly and criminally under § 1201(a) and § 1201(b), yet many
actions will be subject to challenge only under one of the subsections.
In addition, the court has set a dangerous precedent in interpreting §
1201 (a) (2) (A) as strictly as it did. By allowing one feature of a larger software
program to be called into question without the rest of it, the court has
encouraged possible plaintiffs to be as hyper-technical as possible in defining
what is and what is not at issue. This in turn could lead back to more line
blurring between § 1201(a) and § 1201(b), as plaintiffs may be encouraged
to sue under as many theories of liability as possible. But more presently,
this urge to be hyper-technical in defining possible violations of the statute
calls into question the House's own examples of a videocassette recorder or





358 See generally supra Part V.
3s9 See generally Reese, supra note 225(exploring the possible impact on copyright holders,
businesses, the law, and consumers of combined access and rights controls in light of the different levels
of statutory protection afforded to the controls).
M6 See Nimmer, supra note 197, at 689 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998)).
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technological provisions.36' If one feature of a larger piece of software can be
called into question, the same can be said for hardware.
VII. CONCLUSION
Copyright law is more than books, songs, or movies. It is about how we
express ourselves in relation to society as a whole. The Digital Age has
brought about great changes in consumer information and communication
with others. And it shows even more promise.
For centuries, the goal of our copyright jurisprudence has been to
enhance the public welfare by ultimately encouraging new ideas and ways
of thinking. Four thousand years ago man wrote on stone; two thousand
years ago he wrote on papyrus; a thousand years ago he wrote on parchment;
and one hundred years ago he wrote on paper. Now we are writing on
electronic paper with electronic ink, which is stored inside the computer as
a series of positive and negative charges. We can read the inscriptions inside
Egyptian pyramids and on Roman temples. But a DVD player purchased in
England cannot play a DVD purchased in the United States.
As a society, we ought to continue to encourage the broad dissemination
of ideas through all possible means. As a society, we ought also to continue
to protect and compensate those who create and disseminate their ideas. But
as a society, we cannot afford to lock away our ideas and expressions.
36 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 10 (1998).
